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1 
Pereira v. Sessions and the Future of Deportation Proceedings 
By Louisa Edzie1 
Article 1 section 8 of the United States Constitution give 
the U.S. government enumerated powers to establish a uniform 
rule on Naturalization. To carry out these duties, 8 U.S. Code 
§ 1227 gives the government the power to initiate removal 
proceedings against noncitizens who are undocumented or may 
have lost their status in the U.S. However, before removal 
proceedings commence, the government per 8 U.S. Code § 1229 
has to send a Notice to Appear (NTA) to the non-citizen.2 An NTA 
is a written notice given to the noncitizen about the nature of 
proceedings against the noncitizen, the legal authority under which 
the proceedings are conducted, the acts or conduct alleged to be in 
violation of law, the charges against the noncitizen and the 
statutory provisions alleged to have been violated, etc.3 Hence the 
query of whether non-citizens in deportation proceedings have due 
process rights under the Fifth Amendment has been fairly 
established by the courts.4 This provides non-citizens in US 
immigration courts the assurance that the government would 
follow due process of the law in its adjudication of removal 
proceedings. Under the current Trump administration, there has 
been more efforts by the government to undermine Due Process 
protections of non-citizens in the adjudication of removal 
proceedings through unfounded interpretations of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.   
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, grants 
the Attorney General of the United States the  discretion to “cancel 
                                                          
1 Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review  
2 8 U.S. Code § 1229 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
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removal” and adjust the status of certain nonpermanent residents.5 
Specifically, the statute provides a stop-time rule wherein a non-
citizen who has overstayed their visa, and is subject to removal 
proceedings, may be eligible for cancellation of removal 
proceedings if he/she has been physically present and has lived 
continuously in the U.S. for over 10 years preceding the 
application of cancellation of removal.6 For a while, the courts did 
not have a consensus on whether a putative NTA that fails to list 
the place and time for a removal proceeding  stopped time in favor 
of the government for the purposes of cancellation of removal. 
However, in Pereira v. Sessions, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether the stop-time rule is triggered when 
the government serves a non-citizen a NTA that is defective.7 First, 
the Court referred to section 1229(a) of Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) to address the question of what a written 
notice must state. Section 1229(a) of INA provides that a written 
NTA should specify the nature of the proceedings, the legal 
authority under which the proceedings are conducted, and the acts 
or conduct alleged to be in violation of law among other things. 
Importantly, §1229(a)(1)(G)(i) states that the NTA must specify 
the time and date at which the removal proceedings must be held.8 
The Court ruled that a putative NTA that fails to designate 
the specific time or place of a noncitizen’s removal proceedings is 
not an NTA under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1229(a) and hence does not trigger 
the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C.S § 1229(d)(1)(A) for 
determining eligibility for cancellation of removal.9 The Court 
stated that throughout the statutory section, it is clear that an NTA 
is a written notice specifying the time and place at which the 
                                                          
5 §1229b(b) of IIRIRA. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 
(2018) 
6 Id. 
7 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
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removal proceedings will be held.10 Therefore according to the 
Court, the intent of Congress as it relates to a putative NTA 
specifying the time and place for removal proceedings was plain 
and specific. In addition, the Court ruled that common sense leads 
to the conclusion that when it comes to serving NTAs to 
noncitizens, there is a procedure. If that procedure is not followed, 
then the government cannot subject the non-citizen to the 
consequences of failing to appear to his or her removal 
proceedings because a notice that does not inform a noncitizen 
when and where to appear for removal proceedings is not a notice 
to appear.11  
If it is not obvious why the law regarding why Procedural 
Due Process for a putative NTA has to be followed, the standard 
consequence for a non-citizen’s failure to appear is severe should 
suffice. Per law,  if a non-citizen who has been properly served 
with the written notice required under section (2) of  [8 U.S.C.S.] 
§1229(a)” fails to appear at a removal proceedings “he shall be 
ordered to remove in absentia”.12 But for a non-citizen to be 
ordered removed in absentia, “the Government must ‘establish[] by 
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the written notice 
was so provided and that the alien is removable.’”13 This means 
that the burden is on the government to show that it followed due 
process in submitting the NTA  but the respondent did not show. 
And this burden must not be causally overlooked.  
In Pereira, the Department of Homeland Security listed 
several concerns about the consequences of sticking to the 
statutory text of the statute and following the interpretation of the 
Court. The government tried to show the court why it must defer to 
its interpretation of the statute. The government posited that the 
stop-time rule makes broad references to a notice to appear under 
                                                          
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id citing §1229a(b)(5)(A)” 
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“section 1229(a),” which includes paragraph (1), as well as 
paragraphs (2) and (3). The fact that the notice to appear sections 
of the statute appeared under these many sections made its 
meaning as it relates to the stop-time rule of the statute ambiguous.  
Firstly, “the Government [argued] that §1229(a) of INA is 
not worded in the form of a definition and thus cannot 
circumscribe what type of notice counts as a ‘notice to appear’ for 
purposes of the stop-time rule.”14 On this issue, the Court ruled 
that according to §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), notice to appear is defined as a 
“written notice” that “specif[ies],” the time and place of the 
removal proceedings at a minimum.15 The Court further added that 
the government’s failing to specify integral information, like the 
time and place of removal proceedings, unquestionably 
would  “deprive [the notice to appear] of its essential character.”16 
As the Court finds, applying common sense to the situation would 
inescapably lead one to the conclusion that a notice to appear 
losses it function without a specified time and place. In addition, 
without the time and date specified, the respondent is not informed 
of where and when to appear. A proceeding cannot proceed 
without a specific place date and time. 
Secondly, the Government contended that Congress’ use of 
the word “under” in the stop-time rule renders the statute 
ambiguous.17 The stop-time rule provides that “‘any period of . . . 
continuous physical presence’ is ‘deemed to end . . . when the 
[non-citizen] is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 18 
The government alluded that, the statute is not explicit as to what 
“under” means in the statute. The Majority Opinion and the 
Dissent both focused on the technicality of the wording in the 
statute and contended whether the word “under” in the stop-time 
rule provision meant “subject to,” “governed by,” or “issued under 
                                                          
14 Supra 7  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id §1229b(d)(1)(A). 
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the authority of.”19 The Dissent went on to add that “under” can 
also mean “authorized by.20” And if “under” means “authorized by 
or subject to or governed by,” then the government would be doing 
its job and following procedures by sending NTAs without listing 
the particular time and place for the removal hearing.21 According 
to the Majority, this view supports the Board of Immigration’s 
(BIA) view that “the stop-time rule applies so long as DHS serves 
a notice that is ‘authorized by,’ or ‘subject to or governed by, or 
issued under the authority of” §1229(a), even if the notice bears 
none of the time-and-place information required by that 
provision.”22 On this issue, the Court responded by quoting 
Kucana v. Holder.23 The Court calls the word ‘under’ a 
“chameleon,” in that it “must draw its meaning from its context.”24 
And that based on the Court’s reading of the statute, “under” can 
only be interpreted as meaning  “‘in accordance with or according 
to,” for it connects the stop-time trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a 
“notice to appear” that contains the enumerated time-and-place 
information described in §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).”25 Adhering to the 
Court’s interpretation, the stop-time rule applies only if the 
government serves an NTA “[i]n accordance with” or “according 
to” the substantive time-and-place requirements set forth in 
§1229(a).26 
Thirdly, the government resorted to more technical 
arguments contending that the surrounding statutory provisions 
involving “in absentia removal orders” of U.S.C.A 8 § 1229(a) and 
                                                          
19 Id 
20 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Kucana v. Holder 558 U.S. 233, 245, (2010) (quoting Ardestani 
v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135, (1991)). 
24 Id. citing Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 245, (2010) (quoting 
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135, (1991)) 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
 
 
6 
§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) reinforced its statutory interpretation.27 The 
government cited an example of two separate provisions relating to 
in absentia removal orders: §1229a(b)(5)(A) and 
§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). §1229a(b)(5)(A) provides that a noncitizen 
may be removed in absentia if the Government has provided 
“written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 
1229(a)”.28 And §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) provides that, once an in 
absentia removal order has been entered, the noncitizen may seek 
to reopen the proceeding if, inter alia, he “demonstrates that [he] 
did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of 
section 1229(a).”29 The Court ruled that the logic of the 
government statutory provisions surrounding in absentia removal 
orders is unsound.30 To that end, the Court stated that the 
government essentially argues that phrase 1 and phrase 2 can refer 
to the same type of notice even though they use entirely different 
words, but that phrase 3 cannot refer to that same type of notice 
because it uses words different from phrases 1 and 2.31 However, 
according to the Court, the government offers no compelling 
evidence as to why that is and so the Court can only provide a 
simpler explanation that comports with statutory language and 
context, such that each of these three phrases refers to notice 
satisfy at a minimum the time and place criteria defined in 
§1229(a)(1).32 
  The Court did not accept the government’s own 
interpretation of the statute and its contentions based on 
technicalities and practicalities. The government then resorted to 
the administrative disposition of immigration law as a basis for 
why the incomplete NTA must trigger the stop-time rule. It argued 
that the administrative realities of removal proceedings make it 
                                                          
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. parenthesis omitted  
32 Id.  
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difficult to guarantee that each non-citizen a specific time, date, 
and place for his or [her] removal proceedings.33 However, this 
practical concern was misplaced according to the Court. The Court 
rejected the Dissent’s concern that by requiring the government to 
be specific about the time, date, and place for removal proceedings 
of non-citizens on their NTA, it might encourage the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide “arbitrary dates and times 
that are likely to confuse all who receive them.”34  The Court when 
stated that the Dissent’s reasoning makes it appear that the 
government “is utterly incapable of specifying an accurate date and 
time on a notice to appear and will instead engage in ‘arbitrary’ 
behavior.”35 Moreover, the government of the United States is not 
incapable of following due process by sending court dates and 
notices to appear to its respondents.  
Now at this point, it appears that Pereira was a case about a 
statutory technicality. The government relied on mechanics of the 
statute which led to their unfounded and misplaced interpretation 
of the stop-time rule provision of the IIRIRA. However, the 
language in the statute §1229b (b)(1)(A) is clear.  Under the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,  
the Attorney General has discretion to cancel the removal of  (1) 
Certain non-citizens who have continuously lived in the United 
States for not less 10 years immediately preceding the date of the 
deportation can apply for cancellation of removal; and (2) the 
cancellation of removal is halted when the government sends an 
NTA to the non-citizen.36 However, the NTA must follow the 
procedures listed in the statute or it fails to be a valid NTA that 
halts the stop time rule. Even though Pereira’s impact seems little, 
                                                          
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
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many deportations orders are tossed because they did not follow 
the correct procedures.37   
Moreover, Pereira was not just a case about the stop-time 
rule and whether the stop-time rule is triggered when a putative 
NTA fails in cancellation of removal. Pereira also shed light on 
the current interpretation of the Chevron doctrine by the Court. 
Chevron deference is a judicial administrative action that came out 
of the U.S. Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.38 In Chevron, the Supreme Court 
set forth a legal test that governs when the court should defer to the 
agency’s answer or interpretation holding that such judicial 
deference is appropriate where the agency’s answer was not 
unreasonable so long as Congress had not spoken directly to the 
precise issue at question.39 
In Pereira, Justice Kennedy spoke on the application of 
Chevron deference in his concurring opinion, where he noted some 
of the Courts of Appeal hastily yielded to the statutory 
interpretation of the government’s agency when they should not 
have. Yet according to the dissent by Justice Alito, the Court is 
supposed to defer to the interpretation of the government’s agency 
when it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute under the 
Chevron doctrine. Additionally, the government’s agency 
interpretation need not be “the only possible interpretation, nor 
even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts.”40 
Justice Kennedy retorted, saying that simply yielding to the 
                                                          
37Joel Rose, Supreme Court Ruling Means Thousands Of 
Deportation Cases May Be Tossed Out, NPR (April 23, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/17/648832694/supreme-court-ruling-
means-thousands-of-deportation-cases-may-be-tossed-out.  
38 468 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron Deference, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference.  
39 Id.  
40 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018) (quoting 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 208, 129 S. Ct. 
1498, 1499 (2009) 
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interpretation of the government when the statute is ambiguous is 
yielding the Judiciary’s role in interpreting federal statutes. 
According to Justice Kennedy, the Court itself has acknowledged 
that  “[it]does not leave it to the [government] agency to decide 
when it is charge.”41The Court stated that the BIA interpretation of 
section 1229(b)(d)(1) in Matter of Camarillo was wrong and 
unfounded.42 The Court in Pereira rejected the BIA’s 
interpretation that the meaning of 8 U.S.C §1229(b)(d)(1) is 
ambiguous. It added that the BIA’s reasoning  had little support in 
the statute’s text.43 The majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion made it clear that due to the grave consequence 
of a respondent’s failure to appear and the complex nature of  
immigration law, the ordinary statutory interpretation according 
the Chevron deference doctrine should only apply in the 
appropriate case.  The Court posited that the situation in Pereira 
did not warrant a Chevron doctrine application and doing that 
absent an ambiguous statutory meaning would exhibit a reflexive 
deference.44  
 
The Future of Deportation Proceedings after Pereira  
 
In light of this opinion, it is unclear whether Pereira should 
apply retroactively. As previously mentioned, some legal 
advocates interpreted Pereira to have a broad impact on the future 
of deportation hearings. To some legal advocates, Pereira means 
that legal advocates can work to possibly terminate removal cases 
based on defective NTAs.45 Hence, any respondent who may be in 
                                                          
41 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (citing 
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 327, [**454]   
42 25 I.&N Dec. 644 (2011).  
43 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (U.S. June 21, 2018) 
44 Id.  
45 Victoria Neilson, Supreme Court rules on “stop-time” rule for 
cancellation of removal, Catholic Legal Immigration Network. 
Inc.(CLINIC) (March 1, 2019)  
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removal proceedings served with a defective NTA and removed in 
absentia may possibly bring a motion to dismiss or reopen their 
case based on the failure of the government to list the time, date, 
and/or place for the proceeding and based on no notice pursuant to 
INA §§ 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) or 242B(c)(3)(B).46 In a report by Reuters, 
obtained through the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR) in the wake of Pereira, there were about 9,000 cases that 
were dismissed.47 According to the Catholic Legal Immigration 
Network (CLINIC), the broad language of Pereira might mean that 
failure of respondents to appear in court would be through no fault 
of the respondent if the NTA failed to specify the time, place and 
date for the proceeding. This is because § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the 
INA provides that an in-absentia deportation order may be 
rescinded upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien 
demonstrates that he did not receive notice in accordance with 
paragraph (1) or (2) of INA § 239(a), and the failure to appear was 
through no fault of his own.48  
On the other hand, if Pereira is not interpreted narrowly 
then respondents cannot bring suits to dismiss their deportation 
proceedings on grounds of a defective NTA. The U.S Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court in Andia v. Ashcroft held that 
due process jurisprudence indicates that a respondent’s rights 
under the Fifth Amendment are violated if the respondent did not 
receive an actual or constructive notice of the proceedings.49  
                                                                                                                                  
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/supreme-court-rules-stop-time-
rule-cancellation-removal.  
46 Id.  
47 Read Levinson & Kristina Cooke, U.S. courts abruptly tossed 
9,000 deportation cases. Here's why, REUTERS (April 23, 2019),  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-
terminations/u-s-courts-abruptly-tossed-9000-deportation-cases-
heres-why-idUSKCN1MR1HK?feedType=RSS.  
48 Id.  
49 Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004) 
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Furthermore, in Andia v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit 
Appeals court—citing Farhoud v. INS—stated that immigrants 
who are in deportation proceedings are afforded due process for a 
full and fair hearing under the Fifth Amendment.50 Pereira is an 
unusual case which shows that it can be unclear when the Chevron 
Doctrine is to be followed. The separation of powers as it relates to 
the administrative nature of the immigration law is murky in 
practice though feasible in theory. As Justice Kennedy stated in his 
concurring opinion in Pereira, the courts hastily subscribed to the 
interpretation of the BIA when it was considered “reasonable” to 
the BIA. The Dissent in Pereira raised an issue, inferring that the 
majority opinion was requiring the government to put arbitrary 
time, place and date requirements to subsequent NTAs after the 
Pereira ruling or risk being defective.51 However, as the Majority 
contends, these assumptions are unfounded because “a scheduling 
system previously enabled DHS and the immigration courts to 
coordinate in setting hearing dates in some cases.”52 The Court 
further added, “[g]iven today’s advanced software capabilities, it is 
hard to imagine why DHS and immigration courts could not again 
work together to schedule hearings before sending notices to 
appear.”53 
It seems that the government would rather come up with 
excuses and unfounded logical reasoning that bears no semblance 
to Congress’s intentions as the statutes applies than a uniformed 
interpretation of what the law is and should be. The consequences 
of failing to appear, be it expedited removal or removal in absentia, 
should only proceed when due process has served its full course. In 
a completely unrelated case, Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme 
                                                          
50 Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The Due 
Process Clause protects aliens in deportation proceedings and 
includes the right to a full and fair hearing as well as notice of that 
hearing.") Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004) 
51 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2119 (2018) 
52Id.  
53 Id.  
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Court of the United States stated that “[a]s a matter of federal law, 
deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most 
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”54 Deportation is 
an expensive penalty to non-citizen defendants. Though the Court 
in Padilla was referring to a criminal defendant, the rationale can 
also be applied in the deportation court proceedings before 
Immigration Judges.  
  Although Pereira did not receive as much attention from 
the media as other high profile immigration cases like Matter of A-
B-, it made it possible for respondents with illegal re-entry cases to 
request a dismissal of their deportation orders. Matter of A-B was a 
case where in an unprecedented chain of events, former Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions certified an unpublished BIA case to himself. 
The case received so much media coverage because it overruled the 
Matter of A-R-C-G- landmark decision by the BIA, which had 
recognized that domestic violence survivors may be eligible for 
asylum protection.55 Nonetheless, there are dueling interpretations 
in the courts about Pereira. Some courts readily accepted and 
applied the Pereira decision while some courts have distinguished 
Pereira and noted its narrow application. One of the cases that 
depicts the narrow interpretation of Pereira is United States v. 
Flores-Mora.56 Flores-Mora was a Mexican citizen who first 
entered the U.S in 1995 without inspection and was served an NTA 
for removal proceedings in September 2009. The NTA listed the 
date and time of Flores-Mora’s deportation proceeding as “to be 
                                                          
54 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1475 
(2010) 
55 Matter of A-B-: Case Updates, Current Trends, and Suggested 
Strategies, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 
(April 18, 2019) https://www.aila.org/infonet/matter-of-a-b-case-
updates-current-trends.  
56 United States v. Flores-Mora, 2018 DNH 228 
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set.” 57 Flores-Mora signed the NTA, thereby acknowledging his 
understanding of the NTA. Flores-Mora was released on his own 
recognizance [without being detained] 58 On February 4, 2010, he 
was served with a hearing notice, which set the time and date for 
his removal hearing for June 24 2010 at 9:00am. Flores-Mora 
appeared at the hearing. After the February hearing, there were 
four subsequent hearings that Flores-Mora was supposed to appear. 
He received notices of four subsequent removal hearings and 
appeared to 3 of these hearings. He failed to appear a hearing 
scheduled on May 19 and 20, for medical reasons though his 
counsel attended that hearing.59 A subsequent hearing followed 
and was scheduled for June 4, 2010 at 9:00 am.60. The immigration 
court ordered Flores-Mora removed in absentia but Flores-Mora 
never moved to appeal this decision61 On February 19, 2013, ICE 
arrested Flores-Mora in Manchester, New Hampshire and deported 
him to Mexico. Flores-Mora returned to the U.S. at some point 
thereafter and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
arrested him in Manchester, [New Hampshire] on August 28, 2018, 
leading to his present indictment for illegal reentry.62 Flores-Mora 
invoked the Pereira ruling and argued that the immigration court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue his removal order 
because the initial NTA failed to designate a specific time or place 
for his appearance as required by the 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).63  
Flores-Mora argued the NTA the government sent him was not a 
"Notice to Appear" for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13” 64 Hence 
he argued that NTA could not “constitute a charging document 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a), because it did not indicate the time 
                                                          
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
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and date of the hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) under 
the interpretation in Pereira.”65 
 In United States v. Flores-Mora the United States District 
Court for New Hampshire distinguished this case from Pereira. 
The court noted that a few other jurisdictions have adopted the 
Pereira interpretation and have granted motions to dismiss on this 
basis, but the court sided with majority of the courts who have 
rejected Pereira’s interpretation. The court ruled that unlike 
Pereira, the defendant Flores-Mora did receive notice of the time 
and date of his hearing and appeared.”66 In addition, on the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the United States District Court of New 
Hampshire stated that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Pereira 
did not strip the immigration courts of its jurisdiction. The court 
stated that question at issue in Pereira was narrow and addressed 
the specific question of whether a notice to appear that “fails to 
specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings . . . 
trigger[s] the stop-time rule.”67 The United States District Court of 
New Hampshire, Flores-Mora’s situation was different from the 
respondent in Pereira. The court also pointed out a narrow 
difference between the stop-time rule and jurisdiction cases. It 
stated that unlike the stop-time rule, neither the jurisdiction-vesting 
provision of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) nor the definition of charging 
document under § 1003.13 expressly requires that a notice to 
appear contain the information set forth in § 1229(a). Nor do they 
cross-reference § 1229(a) when defining the notice to appear, as 
the stop-time rule does.”68. Furthermore, the court argued that the 
initial NTA was defective and ran afoul of § 1229(a). The 
subsequent NTA that listed the date and time cured any defect that 
the initial NTA might have had. The court used an analogy of a 
how “federal district court may lack subject-matter jurisdiction 
                                                          
65 United States v. Flores-Mora, 2018 DNH 228 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 where the complaint filed in a federal 
district court for diversity purposes that fails to state in its 
complaint the citizenship of the parties or an amount in 
controversy over § 75,000.”69 In  such a situation, a federal district 
court would normally lack jurisdiction because the complaint fails 
to seek an amount in controversy that exceeds over $75,000. 
However, according to the court, that jurisdiction can be restored if 
the complaint is corrected or amended.70 
 In light of Pereira, not only are legal advocates 
representing immigrants bringing requests to dismiss deportation 
orders because of defective NTAs, lawyers are also raising issues 
about the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, 
respondents are bringing suits for immigration courts to dismiss 
deportation orders served to them because it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear their case. According to 8 CFR § 1003.14, 
“[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge 
commence, when a charging document is filed with the 
Immigration Court by the Service. The charging document must 
include a certificate showing service on the opposing party 
pursuant to § 1003.32 which indicates the Immigration Court in 
which the charging document is filed.”71 
Similar to Flores-Mora is United States v. Perez-Felex72. In that 
case, Perez-Felex entered the country without inspection. After 
being apprehended, an immigration judge granted Perez-Felex’s 
request to voluntarily depart from the United States. Perez-Felex 
departed the country and entered again without inspection in 2010.  
In an unrelated charge: 
                                                          
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 United States v. Perez-Felex, No. 18-178 (FAB), 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 216822 (D.P.R. Dec. 21, 2018) 
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Puerto Rico law enforcement officers arrested Pérez 
for purported violations of the Domestic Violence 
Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 8, sections 601-604, for 
possession of a firearm, for possession and use of an 
edged weapon, and for aggravated damages. 
(Docket No. 35 at p. 2.) The Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico Superior Court ultimately dismissed the 
criminal complaint. Immigration Customs 
Enforcement ("ICE") officers, then, placed Pérez in 
federal custody.73  
 
One of the arguments that Perez-Felex relied on to move 
his dismissal of deportation case was that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Pereira invalidated the 2010 deportation order 
against him. The court ruled that Perez-Felex’s reliance on Pereira 
was misplaced. The court further added that Pereira is not 
dispositive in the sense that the narrow issue the Court ruled on 
Pereira was about the stop-time rule and whether or not it was 
triggered if the NTA served did not list the time, place and state for 
the deportation hearing. Therefore, extrapolating the decision in 
Pereira and applying it to Perez-Felex’s case would be unfounded 
due to Pereira’s limited and narrow holding. The court further 
added that Perez adopted a broad interpretation of Pereira by 
asserting that the “immigration judge lacked jurisdiction over him 
because the NTA was deficient.”74 A deficient NTA does not out 
rightly strip the immigration courts of their jurisdiction.  
After it became apparent that the BIA no longer holds 
precedent authority over NTAs as it applies to the stop-time rule 
for cancellation of removal, the BIA issued a decision that aimed 
to push back the Pereira decision in Matter of Bermudez-Costa.75 
                                                          
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Daniel M. Kowalski, BIA Pushes Back Against Pereira: Matter 
of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018) LEXIS NEXIS 
(April 18, 2019), 
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In that case, Bermudez-Costa, a Mexican citizen entered the 
United States without inspection on or about April 30, 1991.76 
Bermudez-Costa was personally served an NTA on August 28, 
2013 which ordered him “to appear before an immigration judge of 
the United States Department of Justice . . . on a date to be set at a 
time to be set.”77 On September 9, 2013, the Immigration Court in 
Tucson, Arizona mailed a subsequent NTA to his address. The 
NTA stated that Bermuda-Costa’s hearing was scheduled to take 
place on May 13, 2014, at 1:00 p.m. at 300 West Congress Street, 
Suite 300, Tucson, Arizona, 85701. Bermuda-Costa appeared at 
this hearing as well as numerous subsequent hearings. At 
Bermuda-Costa’s last hearing, he asked for a “continuance or 
administrative closure based on his potential eligibility for 
adjustment of status.”78  
The Immigration Judge denied his request and granted him 
voluntary departure. Bermuda-Costa then filed a motion to 
terminate while his appeal was pending.79 Bermuda-Costa relied 
on the Pereira decision and argued that his case should be 
terminated in light of the Pereira decision because, like the 
respondent in Pereira, the initial NTA served to him was defective 
“under section 239(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.”80 The BIA held that Pereira involved a different set of facts. 
It added further that unlike the respondent in Pereira, the 
respondent in Bermuda-Costa was properly served with both a 
                                                                                                                                  
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insiden
ews/posts/bia-pushes-back-against-pereira-matter-of-bermudez-
cota-27-i-n-dec-441-bia-2018.  
76 Id.  
77 Matter of German BERMUDEZ-COSTA, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 
2018)  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
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notice to appear and a subsequent notice of hearing.81 The notice of 
hearing specified the time and place of Bermuda-Costa’s hearing 
and there is proof that the respondent got the notices because he 
attended the subsequent hearings. On the issue of serving a valid 
NTA, the BIA held that it had sufficiently specified the time and 
place of the hearing in this case and thus had fulfilled the 
requirements of a valid NTA. One could argue that an NTA is 
different from notice of hearing, at least for the purposes of the 
stop-time rule. This is because a notice to appear stops time from 
accumulating so if qualified, the Attorney General may cancel the 
respondent’s removal. But a notice of hearing just informs the 
respondent that there is a hearing. However, the BIA emphasized 
the narrow and dispositive question that was at issue in Pereira. To 
that end the BIA stated that:  
[t]he Court specifically stated multiple times that 
the issue before it was “narrow” and that the 
“dispositive question” was whether a notice to 
appear that does not specify the time and place at 
which proceedings will be held, as required by 
section 239(a)(1)(G)(i), triggers the “stop-time” rule 
for purposes of cancellation of removal. 82 
When one analyzes the BIA’s arguments presented in 
Matter of Bermuda-Costa, the BIA seems to think that there is no 
room for any a broad application of the Pereira decision that 
would dismiss an entire removal case because the court remanded 
Pereira and specifically did not invalidate the removal proceedings 
of the respondent in Pereira. First, the BIA stated that the Court [in 
Pereira] specifically stated multiple times that the issue before it 
was ‘narrow’ and that the ‘dispositive question’ was whether a 
notice to appear that does not specify the time and place of 
proceedings will be held, as required by section 239(a)(1)(G)(i), 
triggers the stop-time rule for purposes of cancellation of removal. 
                                                          
81 Id.  
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83 The BIA sidelined the decision in Pereira and resorted to the 
authority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, the court that decided Matter of Bermuda-Costa. 
Unsurprisingly, the Ninth Circuit rejected arguments similar to that 
of the respondent Bermudez-Costa. The court rejected arguments 
that purport to dismiss in-absentia removal cases because of a 
defective initial NTAs.84  
Popa v. Holder is another case the BIA cited to support its 
rejection of the decision in Pereira. In Popa v. Holder, the court 
ruled that it comes following the procedure for a putative NTA, 
“[a]lthough [section 239] (a)(1)(G)(i) requires a notice to appear to 
specify the time and place at which the proceedings will be held, 
th[e]court has never held that the [NTA] cannot state that the time 
and place of the proceedings will be set at a future time by the 
Immigration Court.”85  
Since the BIA challenged the Supreme Court on their 
interpretation of the requirements of an NTA after its precedent 
decision in Matter of Bermudez-Costa, it is unclear what the future 
holds as far procedural due process for deportation hearings are 
concerned. Currently, there are two dueling interpretations of 
whether an NTA that does not list the time place and date is 
valid—the Supreme Court Pereira decision and the BIA precedent 
decision in Matter of Bermudez-Costa. Although the Executive 
branch of government is charged with implementing immigration 
laws, the United States Supreme Court is the highest court and its 
decisions are supposed to supersede that of the lower courts and 
administrative agencies. Granted the BIA is the highest 
administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration 
laws, the BIA’s decisions are binding on all DHS officers and 
Immigration Judges unless modified or overruled by the Attorney 
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General or a Federal court.”86According to USCIS the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions are binding on all lower courts and 
administrative adjudicators throughout the country.87 It follows 
then that even with a precedent decision by BIA, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling Pereira should be the binding decision. The BIA’s 
might be persuasive decision but it should not be binding.  
Numerous issues follow, such as if the initial NTA served 
by the DHS to the noncitizen have to follow the procedure for 
putative NTA verbatim as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in 
Pereira or does a subsequent NTA correct the mistakes of the 
initial NTA for purposes of appearing in court as the BIA has held? 
To which type of removal proceedings do these decisions apply? Is 
it first time respondent’s removal proceedings or respondents who 
have made a second attempt in entering, aka illegal reentry? that 
arose in light of the dueling decisions by the US Supreme Court 
and the BIA in Pereira and Matter of Bermudez-Costa respectively 
should now have firm answers.  
Even if some immigration judges decide to follow BIA 
decision, Matter of Bermudez-Costa should not overrule Pereira, 
but only narrow its the application of NTA as it relates to stop-time 
rule for cancellation of removal purposes. This is because the issue 
in Pereira had to do with the stop-time rule as it applies to 
cancellation of removal where the respondent did not receive the 
NTA before his removal proceedings. Where the facts are similarly 
situated like Bermudez-Costa, it would not be surprising for 
immigration judges to follow the decision by the BIA Bermudez-
Costa. However, it should be noted that the court remanded 
                                                          
86 Id.  
87 REFUGEE, ASYLUM, AND INTERNATIONAL 
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (RAIO) Officer Training, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS), (Apr. 18, 
2019) 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/Rea
ding_and_Using_Case_Law_RAIO_Lesson_Plan.pdf.  
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Pereira back to the lower courts after determining that the initial 
NTA sent to the respondent in Pereira was not an NTA under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court did not address the 
lingering question of whether an invalid NTA will give rise to an 
automatic cancellation of a deportation order. Furthermore, a 
practice advisory by CLINIC notes that Bermudez-Costa did not 
address motions to reopen [removal cases] and therefore does not 
foreclose reopening based on a defective NTA, so it encourages 
practitioners to continues to raise arguments that highlights the 
narrow difference between Pereira and Bermudez-Costa.88   
Even though Immigration law is complex with its 
particularities, such as Chevron deference, the Supreme Court 
insisted that this is not the type of case that requires Chevron 
deference. With regards to the future of Deportation Proceedings, 
it is clear from the Pereira decision that at least in cases where a 
putative NTA in removal proceedings fails to list the time or place 
of the initial hearing, the NTA will not interrupt the mandatory 
period of 10 years continuous presence for a noncitizen to be 
eligible for cancellation of removal. Critics have argued that the 
quickness with which BIA issued its precedent decision should not 
be left unnoticed.  
The government’s concerns about noncitizen’s violating 
U.S. immigration laws are legitimate. The U.S. government has a 
responsibility to keep its borders safe and secure, but the 
government must follow the rule of law. As the government seeks 
to exercise its powers, it should strive to follow the due process 
that the law demands. Though the Executive branch of government 
oversees the implementation of immigration laws, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions on immigration laws are binding on 
administrative courts and agencies like the BIA. Therefore, the 
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concept of separation of powers should be adhered to in the 
Immigration Law realm. At the beginning of this review, it was 
uncertain what authority was precedent as far as the question of the 
stop-time rule and its application for the purposes of cancellation 
of removal, but the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pereira established 
that any NTA that does not list the time, place and date cannot 
serve as an NTA that would stop time and give the government the 
power to initiate removal proceedings against a non-citizen. Critics 
argue that Matter of Bermudez-Costa would not be the last word 
on the Pereira ruling. Sooner or later, the Supreme Court will have 
to resolve the question of jurisdiction in light of a defective NTA.  
The Immigration courts are heavily backlogged. It serves 
no purpose for the BIA or any other administrative agency to 
continuously contribute to this backlog by serving defective NTAs 
to the respondents with the aim of correcting them later with a 
subsequent notice of hearing.  If the Immigration courts are not 
ready to adjudicate removal proceedings the DHS should not be 
sending NTAs. The New York Times reports there are about 
800,000 backlogged cases of asylum, illegal entry and overstayed 
visas.89 When the government sends defective NTAs to the wrong 
addresses of respondents as it did in Pereira and respondents have 
no idea if they have been sent an NTA, it serves no purpose for the 
immigration courts. The government fears that some respondents 
that may purposely give the government the wrong address so it 
can accrue more time for the purposes of cancellation of removal. 
However, those situations are distinguishable from situations 
where the DHS may have the correct address but still sends a 
defective NTA. Forestalling due process rights of non-citizens only 
contributes more to an already heavily backlogged system.  
                                                          
89 Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove Bigger 
Barrier for Migrants Than Any Wall, NY TIMES (Apr. 19, 
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Noncitizens need the full protections that the law affords 
them.  Considering that removal in absentia is a grave consequence 
that the non-citizen respondent bears for not appearing at a 
removal proceeding, it is a great injustice if courts remain 
reflexively deferential to the administrative agencies. Like the 
Supreme Court said in Pereira, when the government insists that 
the following the due process as required by law for NTAs is a 
difficult burden to meet it makes the government appear that “is 
utterly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on a 
notice to appear and will instead engage in ‘arbitrary’ behavior.”90 
Arbitrary behavior on the part of the government is when an NTA 
lists the date and time of a removal proceeding as “to be set.” This 
behavior should not be allowed in the advent of technological 
advances. The government; DHS, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol, and the Department of 
Justice bear a burden to implement ways it can efficiently run its 
immigration courts. The government should be capable of sending 
NTAs with the precise place, date, and time just like how the 
criminal justice court serves defendants notices for their court date.  
On the issue of immigrant rights and due process 
protections, it is apparent that noncitizens who are without status 
do not have much protections under due process unlike citizens of 
the U.S. Given that a lot of noncitizens in removal proceedings 
appear in in immigration courts pro se, it is huge detriment if due 
process of the law under the immigration and Nationality Act is 
undermined.91 According to a New York Times article, appeals of 
removal proceedings takes years and months because there is a 
significant backlog of cases 92     
                                                          
90 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) 
91 Deportation and Due Process, ACLU, (Apr. 23, 2019) 
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There are systems put in place to help with the immigration 
system. Noncitizens in the U.S have due process rights. It is 
important that the people’s trust and reliance in those systems to 
work is not wavered. Uniform laws in immigration law is 
important in ensuring a fair day in court for non-citizens.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/politics/due-process-
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